Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto
In: Group decision and negotiation, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 223-233
ISSN: 1572-9907
29 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Group decision and negotiation, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 223-233
ISSN: 1572-9907
In: Studies in Choice and Welfare; Handbook on Approval Voting, S. 469-481
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 257-260
In: Revue économique, Band 73, Heft 6, S. 1055-1068
ISSN: 1950-6694
Nous proposons divers modèles dont le but est d'expliquer la formation des stéréotypes. Un stéréotype est interprété comme un jugement émis par un observateur à propos d'un groupe d'individus ou d'objets. Pour chaque membre du groupe, on suppose que l'on observe une caractéristique appartenant à un ensemble dénombrable. La formation des stéréotypes est alors modélisée par une fonction de perception. Dans notre modèle de base, une fonction de perception combine trois étapes : 1) les caractéristiques sont codées numériquement de telle sorte que plus le nombre associé à une caractéristique est élevé, plus cette caractéristique est en accord avec le stéréotype étudié, 2) le vecteur de nombres ainsi obtenu est agrégé de manière cohérente en un nombre unique et enfin 3) ce nombre unique est comparé à un seuil et le stéréotype est accepté dès lors que le seuil est dépassé. Nous donnons une caractérisation des fonctions de perception qui entrent dans le cadre de ce modèle. Nous examinons enfin diverses extensions du modèle de base. JEL Codes: C44, D70.
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 114, S. 95-97
International audience ; We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
BASE
International audience We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
BASE
International audience ; We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
BASE
In: Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming
SSRN
Working paper
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 90, S. 9-17
SSRN
Working paper
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 226-237
In: Studies in choice and welfare
In: Public choice
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Studies in Choice and Welfare; Handbook on Approval Voting, S. 153-163